Here’s a piece that I haven’t seen linked at my favorite aggregation sites that I think is interesting and worth the time in that it challenges conventional economic wisdom. I offer a snippet below in order to try to whet your appetite.
[G]iven its direct and indirect influence on policy making and for reasons of democratic accountability, economics should become much more aware of the values it (implicitly or explicitly) endorses. Those values are embedded in some of the basis concepts used but also in some of the assumptions in the theory-building.
The textbook example in the philosophy of economics literature to illustrate the insufficiently acknowledged value-ladenness of economics is the notion of Pareto efficiency, also known as ‘the Pareto criterion’. Yet time and time again (for me most recently two days ago at a seminar in Oxford) I encounter economists (scholars or students) who fail to see why endorsing Pareto efficiency is not value-neutral, or why there are good reasons why one would not endorse the Pareto-criterion.
I encourage you to read the entire article.
Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates (which manages about $150 billion in assets), has released this 30 minute video explaining his vision of “How the Economic Machine Works.” It is well worth watching, particularly for his description of the potential for a “beautiful deleveraging.” Dalio concludes with three helpful rules of thumb for individuals and policy-makers: (1) Don’t have debt rise faster than income (because your debt burdens will eventually crush you); (2) Don’t have income rise faster than productivity (because you’ll eventually become uncompetitive): and (3) Do all that you can to raise your productivity (because, in the long run, that’s what matters most).
As Sheldon Cooper would have it, physics explains everything. All the workings of the universe, from black holes and dark energy to the financial markets down to the inner workings of our brains and the atoms and molecules that comprise them are assumed to be controlled by the same set of fundamental physical laws. That goes a long way towards explaining why the finance industry hires so many physics Ph.Ds. Anyway, or so the thinking goes, the only people who are studying anything really interesting are – like Sheldon – theoretical physicists.
The misplaced triumphalist arrogance of certain physicists (and many alleged experts) is nothing new, of course. For example, the discoverer of the positron proclaimed that, thenceforth, “the rest is chemistry.”
Unfortunately for Sheldon, the ability to reduce everything to physics does not mean that we can start with physics and reconstruct – or even model meaningfully – the universe. In fact, the more we learn about fundamental physics, the less relevance it seems to have to our everyday world, largely on account of scale and complexity. Continue reading
If it hadn’t happened to me, I don’t think I would have believed it. It seemed like a caricature that SNL or even Rush Limbaugh might invent. It was almost funny at the time, but upon further reflection isn’t funny in the least. It’s pretty scary actually.
I attended the annual Los Angeles Times Festival of Books once again over the week-end. As always, it was engaging and interesting. I learned some more about ideas and authors I wanted to learn more about and discovered some new ones too. But one bizarre experience (sadly) takes the cake.
In his book The World in Six Songs, neuroscientist Daniel Levitan of McGill University seeks to outline and explain our emotional lives and heritage in a mere six songs – songs of friendship, joy, comfort, knowledge, religion and love. I am attempting a task no less daunting. I hope to condense and explain our current economic condition in just six songs.
So here goes.
“You know I work all day; to get you money to buy you things.”
For the economy, the “rubber meets the road” precisely at this point. We need more people working so that they can “buy you things” for the economic climate to improve. In other words, our primary economic problem is a lack of aggregate economic demand. As McKinsey points out, “the single greatest fear among executives everywhere is weak consumer demand for their companies’ products and services.”
The following chart shows velocity as the ratio of the money supply (M2) to nominal GDP. It rose from 1.85 in 2003 to 1.96 in 2006 but has since fallen to a current level of 1.572 as households reduced spending and increased saving while banks and businesses hoard cash.
Simply put, money needs to get moving again.
The Fed is practically giving money away in its attempts to juice the economy — essentially trying to force everyone into equities and giving capital away to try to spur growth. But it isn’t working. Meanwhile, savers, retirees and others on fixed incomes are being punished by the low interest rate environment in that no relatively safe yield-producing investment vehicles are available. Because of the crazy-low interest rates, interest income is down over 30 percent since August, 2008.
On the other hand, the plutocrat class continues to outperform. Republicans say they support equal opportunity and the entrepreneurial spirit while Democrats say they look out for the disaffected. But pretty much everyone in office forgets their alleged principles in order to get or stay close to those with the money — perhaps to finance the next campaign. Their principles don’t mean very much when it comes to sucking up to the rich and famous.
That’s takin’ care of business at its most crass.
The American economy (not to mention the American Dream) is predicated upon the idea that we all have the opportunity to get ahead. Sadly, it doesn’t seem to be working out that way today. Real wages have steadily declined and benefits continue to decline too.
It’s not supposed to be “all takin’ and no givin’.”
While corporate earnings and profits are very high, employees are not sharing in that success. Indeed, those workers with good jobs have to keep working harder and harder without being rewarded for it (see below) — even with job security.
That’s working very hard for the money indeed.
Even though the recession is said to have ended, the newly employed don’t seem often to have obtained very good jobs. For example, 20-something college degree holders here in California, where I live, are still finding professional jobs extremely hard to come by more than 3 years into the alleged recovery. At 15 percent, the U-3 unemployment rate for California’s college grads under 30 is nearly twice the national rate, and the most common jobs for those who find them are retail, clerical, and food service positions — hardly dream jobs. And according to the U.S. Census Bureau, more than half of California’s half-million degree holders in their 20′s are underemployed. In fact, the most popular job for the most populous state’s young professionals is retail store floor sales.
They may as well be workin’ at the car wash.
The National Intelligence Council is composed of the 17 U.S. government intelligence agencies. The Council’s Global Trends Report has, since 1997, worked with a variety of experts both in and out of government service to examine factors such as globalization, demography and the environment to produce a forward-looking document to aid policymakers in their long-term planning on key issues of worldwide importance.
“We are at a critical juncture in human history, which could lead to widely contrasting futures,” wrote Christopher Kojm, the Council’s Chair, in his introduction to the current Report, published just this week.
The Report is intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories over the next 15 years. Significantly, it does not seek to predict the future – we have a dreadful track record in the regard – but instead it seeks to provide a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.
The Report argues that the breadth of global change we are facing today is comparable to that during and surrounding the French Revolution and the rise of the Industrial Age in the late 18th century, but it is being realized at a much faster rate. While it took Britain more than 150 years to double its per capita income, India and China are set to undergo the same level of growth in a tenth of the time, with 100 times more people.
I encourage all investors to read it carefully. Despite the vital importance of the “long cycle,” it isn’t likely to change your current portfolio outlook, but it will provide a helpful backdrop to your overall thinking and to your longer-term outlook and analysis.
Among the Report’s conclusions is that there are certain “megatrends” that are relative certainties and that we should prepare to deal with them. These include the following (and note that all have investment implications, some of them potentially enormous).
- For the first time in history, a majority of the world’s population will no longer live in poverty by 2030, leading to a healthier global population and a major expansion of the middle classes in most countries.
- Life expectancies will continue to expand rapidly. “Aging” countries (such as those in the West – particularly Europe – and Japan) face the possibility of a significant decline in economic growth.
- Asia is set to surpass North America and Europe in global economic power, but there will not be any hegemonic power.
- Demand for resources will increase owing to global population growth from 7.1 billion people today to about 8 billion by 2030.
- Demand for food is likely to rise by 35 percent and energy by 50 percent over the next 15-20 years.
- Nearly half of the world’s population will live in areas with severe water stress by 2030. Fragile states are most at risk, but China and India are vulnerable to volatility of key resources.
These megatrends will inevitably lead to a variety of vexing and potentially “game-changing” questions. Each has profound political, economic, market and human implications.
- Will divergences and increased economic volatility result in more global breakdown or will the development of multiple growth centers lead to increased resiliency? For much of the West, the challenges involve sustaining growth in the face of rapidly aging populations. For China and India, the main challenge will be to avoid “middle income traps.” In general, the global economy will be increasingly crisis-prone and won’t return to pre-2008 growth levels for “at least” the next decade.
- Will current governments and international institutions be able to adapt fast enough to harness and channel change instead of being overwhelmed by it? While this sounds generally like the investment challenge we face daily, there are a variety of major global issues in this regard. Potentially (more) serious government deficits driven by rapid political and social changes are likely to exist. Countries moving from autocracy to democracy are often unstable and about 50 emerging market countries fall into this major risk group. All of them could – at least potentially – grow out of their governance incongruities by 2030 if economic advances continue.
- Will rapid changes and shifts in power lead to conflicts? The general answer is surely duh, with uncertainty only as to the number, extent and nature of the conflicts. Limited natural resources—such as water and arable land—in many of the same countries that will have disproportionate levels of young men—particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and parts of the Middle East—increase the risk of intrastate conflict. It is particularly troubling to note that any future wars in (at least) Asia and the Middle East may well include a nuclear element. Many of these conflicts, once begun, would not be easily containable and would (obviously) have global impacts.
- Will regional instability, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, spill over and create global insecurity? See the commentary re #3 above. Wash; rinse; repeat.
- Will technological breakthroughs occur in time to solve the problems caused by rapid urbanization, strains on natural resources, and climate change? The report identifies 16 key “disruptive” technologies with potential global significance out to 2030. They are generally grouped around potential energy breakthroughs, food- and water-related innovations, big data and the forecasting of human behavior, and the enhancement of human mental and physical capabilities, including anti-aging.
- Will the United States, as the leading actor on the world stage today, be able to reinvent the international system, carving out potential new roles in an expanded world order? The Report anticipates that the U.S. will likely remain primus inter pares (first among equals) among the other great powers in 2030 because of the multifaceted nature of its power and legacies of its leadership. But it also expects that the “unipolar moment” is over. Overall, power will likely shift to networks and coalitions in a multipolar world. The United States’ (and the West’s) relative decline is seen as inevitable but its future role in the international system is much harder to project. China is deemed unlikely to replace the U.S. as international leader by 2030. Non-state actors and even individuals, empowered by new media and technology, will be an increasing threat. A reinvigorated U.S. economy – spurred perhaps by U.S. energy independence – could increase the prospects that the growing global and regional challenges would be addressed. However, if the U.S. fails to rebound, a dangerous global power vacuum would be created.
From these building blocks and issues, the Report posits potential futures including a best-case scenario of increased cooperation between the U.S., China and Europe as economic and security interests increasingly align, a worst case scenario of conflict and fragmentation in a stalled global economy where political, social and economic inequalities work against integration and stability, and a scenario involving a “nonstate world,” where the nation-state does not disappear, but countries increasingly organize and orchestrate “hybrid” coalitions of state and nonstate actors which shift depending on the issue.
There is no earth-shaking news here. But it is helpful to take a step back and look at the bigger picture once in a while. Because change is so often incremental, it is easy to underestimate how quickly it can happen and how much impact it can have in the aggregate. In the markets as in life, caveat emptor.
Fifty years ago this month, Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published, and it remains one of the more influential books of our time. It is also one of the most cited academic books of all time. If you haven’t read it or read it recently, you might pick up a copy of the new 50th anniversary edition.
If you have ever heard or used the term “paradigm shift” then you have been influenced by Kuhn. Before Kuhn, our views of science were dominated by ideas about how it ought to develop (the “scientific method”) together with a sense of narrative, of science marching forward inexorably and heroically.
Where the standard account saw steady, cumulative “progress,” Kuhn saw movement and discontinuities – a set of alternating “normal” and “revolutionary” phases in which communities of specialists in particular fields are plunged into periods of difficulty and uncertainty. These revolutionary phases (e.g., the transition from Newtonian mechanics to quantum physics) correspond to great conceptual breakthroughs which are often ignored or rejected for long periods prior to ultimate acceptance and which form the foundation for succeeding phases in which the breakthrough has become the consensus. That this version of history seems no-big-deal now demonstrates how powerful his ideas have become.
Per Popper, “normal science” is distinguished by the fact that it focuses upon refuting rather than confirming its theories. However, and consistent with more recent discoveries of our behavioral flaws and biases, “normal” scientists in reality spend most of their time trying to confirm what they already think — their paradigm. We shouldn’t be surprised whenever confirmation bias rears its head.
That Kuhn deemed his book a mere “sketch” (only 172 pages) is part of its charm and its power. It is simple, straightforward and easy to understand. It just makes sense.
A ”paradigm” as an intellectual framework that makes research possible. It’s clear (to me at least) that the finance world needs a new paradigm. Its model-driven alleged rationality just plain doesn’t work very well. It doesn’t fit the data and is inconsistent with experience at nearly every level. The best of cutting-edge financial, economic and scientific research today is data- rather than theory-driven. Being data driven is a focus of this blog (see, e.g., here, here, here and here), as the masthead proclaims. I hope that our next financial paradigm (not to mention economic and political paradigms) is predicated not upon some overarching theory, but rather upon that which can be demonstrated to work. That’s more than enough of an intellectual framework for me.
Thomas Kuhn deserves as much.
In my 7th grade music class, every student was required by Miss Perkins to give a report on a piece of music. I picked a popular subject: Iron Butterfly‘s psychedelic hit, In-A-Gadda-Da-Vida. It was a 17 minute reflection of or on something-or-other. My “research” was straight off the album cover (for those of you who remember what album covers were). “Iron” signifies heavy, man, and so on. I worked hard to learn the drum solo too.
For those of you looking for a frame of reference, Kevin and Winnie Cooper of The Wonder Years are exactly my age and year in school and In-A-Gadda-Da-Vida was playing in the first kiss episode from the 8th grade where Kevin and Winnie are at their first couples party and they head to the make-out room. That episode also features The Turtles‘ terrific Happy Together. Anyway, here’s the song, which we thought sounded like the future, and a pretty exciting (if drug-induced) one at that.
I wanted very much to be groovy but wasn’t. It didn’t stop me from trying, however, as with my silly report. In-A-Gadda-Da-Vida indeed.
And my parents — founding members of the Establishment that I saw them to be — were anything but groovy and, in fact, were unalterably opposed to anything with even a whiff of groovy. They were even…Republicans.
To be clear, my parents were hardly of the “country club Republican” sort. We didn’t belong to a country club. In retrospect, there was nothing “establishment” about them either. Neither of them went to college. We didn’t own or run a business. My mom worked outside the home. We weren’t anything remotely close to rich.
But we were Republicans. Hard work was good. Entitlements were bad. Saving was good. Profligate spending was bad. Traditional values were sacred. The idea of turning on, tuning in and dropping out was anathema. Our leaders — all authority figures really — deserved and got our respect if not necessarily our support (Jacob Javits was pretty liberal, after all).
Vietnam was an unfortunate but necessary evil. Dick Nixon hadn’t been their first choice (or second or third), but he would deal with those hippies and the Soviets too. Watergate (waiting just over the horizon) was horrible and wrong, but it was also stupid and silly. Nobody was going to vote for McGovern anyway. And FDR had done stuff just as bad. We were sure of it.
Our government was a creeping socialism and politicians weren’t statesmen anymore.
The clothes worn by “the youth” were just plain bizarre. So was the hair. So was the lingo. And the music….
So whenever my school lessons featured FDR saving us from the Great Depression, my parents were quick to point out that it wasn’t FDR. It was World War II.
They weren’t wrong, of course. Producing and distributing what we needed to fight the Axis powers propelled the country out of the Depression and went a long ways toward making us the strongest and greatest economy in the world, not to mention the #1 (with a bullet, literally and figuratively) superpower.
To hear Paul Krugman tell it, the key was demand (it didn’t and doesn’t matter for what) and we can fix the current mess by spending our way out of it just like FDR did. As Keynes argued in the 1930s, the only solution in such circumstances is major fiscal stimulus to close the gap between actual and potential output. TARP wasn’t enough. QE1 wasn’t enough. QE2 wasn’t enough. Operation Twist wasn’t enough. QE3 won’t be enough.
I get his point, but he’s missing something crucial, I think, besides the reality that all the demand we spur will need to be paid for eventually and we have shown no willingness to do so even assuming we had the ability. It wasn’t just that WWII put people back to work. There was a fundamental change in the nature of the output.
A key problem during the Great Depression was that increased (and increasing) productivity meant that a largely rural and agrarian workforce didn’t have nearly enough work to do. The War, essentially by force, transitioned that work force to the cities and into industrial and manufacturing jobs. Once the war was over, heavy-duty military spending was still necessary to maintain our new-found status and the other stuff we produced was being used here and shipped abroad too as American hegemony was extended around the globe.
Today, increased (and increasing) productivity and cheaper labor overseas leaves our workforce underemployed again. Since the internet boom of the 1990s, we have recognized — if dimly — that our future is a digital one. But we haven’t yet figured out how to make the transition and there has been no great catalyst (the way the War was then) to force and complete the “creative destruction” needed to make the structural shift once-and-for-all. The process is a messy one. It is often unpleasant. Workers will be pushed out of their comfort zones or even displaced. Some individual results will be unfortunate, tragic even. Creative destruction is still destruction.
Even so, we piddle along, on a slow boat not-even-to China. Today’s employment numbers provide another series of data points reiterating the obvious. We have no idea (economically speaking) where we’re going and thus, of necessity, have no idea how to get there. We’re stuck between preserving a past that no longer works and attempting to forge a future that is unfocused and uncertain (Facebook, anyone?). The alleged “new economy” isn’t defined a whole lot better today than it was back when almost any kid with a computer and a dream could get a boat-load of start-up money.
The process of “making the future” (to use President Obama’s phrase) is an inductive one that progresses primarily by discovering what doesn’t work so as to ascertain, oh-so-tentatively, what might work.
As the expression goes, if you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there. Unfortunately, today we don’t even seem to be moving much at all. And while we have a pretty good idea what the future consists of, we don’t know what it ought to look like. Until we do, it’s going to be hard for us to put this Great Recession behind us, no matter how much demand we spur. As my friend Tom Brakke noted on Twitter when he read this piece, economy-wise, we’re not In-A-Gadda-Da-Vida.
Not by a long shot.
We crave certainty.
As reported by Harvard’s Daniel Gilbert on the Happy Days blog at nytimes.com, Maastricht University researchers gave (volunteer) subjects a series of 20 electric shocks. Some subjects were told that they would receive an intense shock every time while others were told that they would receive 17 mild shocks and 3 intense ones, but that they wouldn’t know on which of the 20 the intense shocks would come. The study showed that subjects who thought there was a small chance of receiving an intense shock were more afraid — they sweated more profusely, their hearts beat faster — than those who knew for sure that they’d receive an intense shock. Interestingly, that’s because people feel worse when something bad might occur than when something bad will occur — they find uncertainty more painful than the things they’re uncertain about.
Why do people seem to prefer to know the worst rather than merely to suspect it? According to Gilbert, that’s probably because when most of us get bad news we cry for a bit and then get busy making the best of things. We change our behaviors and we change our attitudes. We raise our attentiveness and lower our expectations. We find our bootstraps and pull (pretty hard if necessary). But we can’t come to terms with circumstances whose terms we don’t yet know. An uncertain future leaves us stranded in an unhappy present with nothing to do but wait.
We all respond positively to increased certainty in our lives (including in financial outcomes) — even after a major shock and when that certainty limits our prospective gain. In these highly uncertain times, increased certainty can be a highly valuable commodity. Unfortunately, our level of certainty – desired though it is – is not well correlated to the facts.
The day after the space shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, Cornell psychology professor Ulric Neisser (who died last month at 83) had his students write precisely where they’d been when they heard about the disaster. Nearly three years later, he asked them to recount it again. A quarter of the accounts were strikingly different, half were somewhat different, and less than a tenth had all the details correct. Yet all were confident that their most recent accounts were completely accurate. Indeed, many couldn’t be dissuaded even after seeing their original notes. One of them even asserted, “That’s my handwriting, but that’s not what happened.”
For neurologist Robert Burton, the Neisser study is emblematic of an essential quality of who we are. In his brilliant book, On Being Certain, Burton systematically and convincingly shows that certainty is a mental state, a feeling like anger or pride that can help guide us, but that doesn’t dependably reflect anything like objective truth. One disconcerting finding he describes is that, from a neurocognitive point of view, our feelings of certainty about things we’re right about is largely indistinguishable from our feelings of certainty about things we’re wrong about.
Such unwarranted certainty is consistent with our tendency (discussed earlier this week here and here) to build our ideologies first and then to construct narratives to support those ideologies, with facts and data only sought out to undergird our pre-conceived notions after the fact and subjectively “analyzed” only in that light. It also suggests why we can be so uncomfortable with the necessarily inductive process of scientific inquiry. We’d much prefer the certainty of deductive logic. Sadly, much that claims to be “research” in the financial world is nothing of the sort – it is ideology (or sales literature) in disguise (and not very well disguised at that). Even so, perceived certainty gives us the confidence we need to make decisions and to establish trust and credibility with others. It’s an ironic feedback loop of sorts.
Good science requires the careful and objective collection of data with any interpretations and conclusions drawn therefrom being tentative and provisional, and of course subject to any subsequent findings. But that’s not what often happens, especially in the financial world. As Columbia’s Rama Cont points out, “[w]hen I first became interested in economics, I was surprised by the deductive, rather than inductive, approach of many economists.” In the hard sciences, researchers tend to observe empirical data and then build a theory to explain their observations, while “many economic studies typically start with a theory and eventually attempt to fit the data to their model.” As noted by Emanuel Derman:
In physics it’s fairly easy to tell the crackpots from the experts by the content of their writings, without having to know their academic pedigrees. In finance it’s not easy at all. Sometimes it looks as though anything goes.
I suspect that these leaps of ideological fancy are a natural result of our constant search for meaning in an environment where noise is everywhere and signal vanishingly difficult to detect. We are meaning-makers at every level and in nearly every situation. Yet, as I have noted before, information is cheap and meaning is expensive. Therefore, we tend to short-circuit good process to get to the end result – typically and not so coincidentally the result we wanted all along.
Science progresses not via verification (which can only be inferred) but by falsification (which, if established and itself verified, provides certainty as to what is not true). Thank you, Karl Popper. In our business, as in science generally, we need to build our investment processes from the ground up, with hypotheses offered only after a careful analysis of all relevant facts and tentatively held only to the extent the facts and data allow. Yet the markets demand action. There is nothing tentative about them. That’s the conundrum we face.
The scientific process cannot offer meaning and can only suggest interpretation. Near the end of her wonderful novel, Housekeeping, Pulitzer Prize winner (for the equally wonderful Gilead) Marilynne Robinson notes that ”[f]act explains nothing. On the contrary, it is fact that requires explanation.” This is a telling observation and one those who are overly enamored with the scientific process are prone to ignore or forget. Science is a fabulous tool – the best we have – but also merely a tool. It is not a be-all nor is it an end-all. Derman again: “[d]ata alone doesn’t tell you anything, it carries no message.” Brute fact requires both meaning and context in order to approach anything like truth or understanding. But meaning is increasingly difficult to find in a world and with respect to markets that demand definitive answers (or at least definitive decisions) immediately.
I’m certain of it.